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greater amount. In addition, the procyclicality of the financial system and the crisis exacerbates the effect, although 
the results differ across bank ownership  
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent times, the issue of procyclicality of banking firms has come into much prominence, as it 
was perceived to be one of the underlying causes of the recent financial crisis. Excessive procyclicality of 
bank lending may amplify macroeconomic fluctuations, thereby threatening the stability of the financial 
system. Quantifying these risks remains a challenge, especially since financial soundness indicators for 
banks tend to improve in the upward phase of the credit cycle. Country experiences suggest that credit 
booms can be associated with unsustainable domestic demand growth, overheating and asset price 
bubbles. Financial sector difficulties cannot be ruled out either, for example, loan losses following a 
protracted recession. How significant these risks are and what role should public policy play are key 
questions confronting policymakers.  
In this context, whether and to what extent the funding structure of banks influences their lending 
behavior has not been adequately addressed in the literature. Aggregate bank-level data for OECD 
economies indicates that in several of such countries (Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland), 
deposits have steadily lost ground at the expense of non-deposit funds (ECB, 2008a; 2008b). This change 
in the funding composition was called into question in the wake of the recent financial meltdown. In 
particular, wholesale funding created significant maturity mismatches with banks devoting limited 
attention to the consequences of potential risks of drying up of such funds. As confidence withered and 
depositors began withdrawing their funds en masse, banks found it increasingly difficult to meet such 
large and sudden withdrawals and took recourse to interbank markets to fund maturity mismatches. With 
confidence in financial institutions having eroded, the interbank market also came to a standstill, leaving 
banks with no recourse but to seek government intervention. Across countries and continents, besides 
conventional (cuts in key policy rates, liquidity injections) and unconventional (collateral swaps, 
introduction of foreign currency swap lines, quantitative easing) policy measures, governments have 
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heavily intervened in banks, including resorting to outright nationalization (as in US, UK, Russia, 
Belgium), increasing depositor protection limits (as in US, UK, Germany, Australia, Hungary, Czech 
Republic), injecting capital in troubled banks (as in US, UK, France, Germany, Switzerland, Russia), to 
mention a few.  
Towards this end, this paper focuses on the relationship between funding structure and bank 
lending for GCC countries. To the best of our knowledge, this is perhaps one of the early studies to 
explore such an interlinkage and most certainly for the GCC countries. The bank-level data enables to 
improve the accuracy of estimation and clearly discern the impact of funding structures on bank lending, 
and employ control variables so as to obtain ‘clean’ estimates to the maximum permissible extent.  
The GCC banking system provides a reasonable laboratory to examine this issue in a holistic 
fashion. These countries share similar economic and social characteristics and are essentially dependent 
on a single primary commodity for exports. On average, hydrocarbon accounts for nearly half of the 
region’s GDP, contributes over 70% of these countries merchandise exports and over three-fifths of 
government revenues (IMF, 2010a). Following the oil boom, real GDP growth in these countries 
averaged over 6.5% during 2003-08 as compared to less than 4% during the preceding five year period. 
Non-oil GDP growth improved markedly, averaging nearly 7.5% during this period (IMF, 2010 a,b; 
2011). The fiscal and external positions also witnessed an upturn, providing headroom to the authorities 
for greater economic diversification, while allowing the surpluses to be invested for productive purposes.  
The analysis employs a detailed bank-level dataset. The core of the data is the information on 
bank’s balance sheet and income expenditure details as published by Bankscope, a comprehensive, global 
database containing information on nearly 30,000 public and private banks globally. The data has been 
extensively utilized in cross-country banking research, including examination of issues relating to bank 
interest margin (Demirguc Kunt and Huizinga, 1999), market discipline and deposit insurance (Demirguc 
Kunt and Huizinga, 2004), privatization and bank performance (Boubakri et al. 2005), foreign bank 
penetration (Haas and Lelyveld, 2006), corporate governance and bank risk taking (Laeven and Levine, 
2009) and more recently, the impact of legal changes on bank lending (Haselmann et al., 2010) and 
relationship between bank efficiency and stock market performance (Liadaki and Gaganis, 2010).  
The present study contributes to the literature in several distinct ways. First, the study augments 
the emerging literature that explores the relevance of bank funding structures. Second, the study adds to 
the extant literature on bank lending by examining how wholesale dependence across different bank 
characteristics influences loan supply (Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011). Besides being an under-
researched area of study, it is one of the few articles to examine this issue for GCC countries, which 
typically have bank-based financial systems. Finally, the paper complements a growing body of empirical 
research that explores the effects of the global financial crisis on the banking system. While several 
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studies have examined the behavior of U.S. banks during the crisis (Huang, 2010; Boyson et al., 2011; 
Santos, 2011), the interplay between bank lending and funding structure and how it is affected by the 
crisis is an aspect that has not been investigated in prior empirical research.  
The reminder of the article continues as follows. The relevant literature is briefly reviewed in 
Section 2. Section 3 provides certain stylized facts regarding bank funding and lending in these countries. 
Section 4 sets up the empirical strategy, followed by the results (Section 5) and concluding remarks 
(Section 6).  
 
2. Literature Review 
Several explanations have appeared in the literature to explain fluctuations in credit policies of 
banks. Bernanke and Gertler (1990) explain the phenomenon of procyclicality within a financial 
accelerator framework. With information asymmetry between banks and borrowers, economic upturns 
lead to an improvement in the valuation of potential collateral, making access to bank finance easier. As 
downturn sets in and collateral values become depressed, banks deleverage by cutting back credit and 
recalling their loans, amplifying the credit contraction.  
Another source of procyclicality is the financial sector misperception of risk by financial market 
participants, as reflected in banks’ lending and investment decisions (Borio et al., 2001). Market 
participants behave as if risk declines during the upswing phase and rises only when downturn sets in. 
This is caused mainly by difficulties in measuring the time dimension of risk, often leading to risk being 
under-estimated during boom times and over-estimated during downswings, creating laxity in credit 
standards during booms.  
A third source of procyclicality can be traced to incorrect compensation structures. Once 
managers obtain a reasonable return on equity for their shareholders, they may engage in activities that 
depart from the firm’s value maximization. To the extent that managers have limited liability, a 
manifestation of this possibility could be to favour high risk-return strategies (i.e., over extension of 
credit) in order to increase the social presence of bank managers or the power of managers in an enlarging 
organization (Williamson, 1963).  
Banking sector liberalization could lead to credit booms not only as a result of increased 
profitable opportunities in more risky sectors, but also as a result of increased competition for market 
share triggered by asymmetric information about the creditworthiness of borrowers (Dell’Ariccia, 2001; 
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006). Countries with recently liberalized banking sectors tend to have a high 
proportion of borrowers with unknown creditworthiness. Banks attempt to garner greater market shares 
by loosening their credit requirements, leading to higher than expected demand for credit.  As adverse 
selection sets in, repayments become difficult, compelling banks to cut back on their credit supply.   
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Several empirical studies have recently examined the pro-cyclical nature of bank lending. The 
balance of evidence appears to suggest that lending rapidly increases during the growth phase, in effect 
implying that credit cycles would tend to amplify business cycles. Using Spanish bank-level data, Salas 
and Saurina (2002) finds that economic shocks are quickly transmitted to Spanish banks. Employing a 
similar framework, Jimenez and Saurina (2006) observes that collateral requirements are significantly 
compromised during a business upturn, fuelling a lending boom. Focusing specifically on the subprime 
episode, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) finds that lending standards tend to be compromised more in areas that 
experienced larger credit booms.  
Another strand of the literature examines the use of wholesale funding and its role in the recent 
subprime crises. Ratnovski and Huang (2009) explores the factors behind the unusual resilience of 
Canadian banks during the recent global meltdown and finds that they relied less on wholesale funding 
than their peers in other advanced countries. Demirguc Kunt and Huizinga (2010) found that banks’ 
resilience on non-deposit funds increases their risk. Other studies show that banks that relied heavily on 
wholesale funds were more affected by the liquidity crunch, experienced a large abnormal decline in their 
share prices (Adrian and Shin, 2009; Raddatz, 2010). In effect, the evidence strongly suggests that greater 
use of wholesale funding exposed banks to newer types of risks that were not accounted for in their risk 
management practices, leading them to ultimately cut back on their lending activities.  
Closer to the region, Khamis (2010) provides an overview of the financial crisis on GCC 
countries. Al Hassan et al (2010) analyses the banking sector in the GCC economies, including trends in 
ownership, balance sheet exposures and risks. Espinosa and Prasad (2010) analyze the delinquent loans in 
GCC banks and finds that a decline in non-oil GDP growth by 3 percentage points would raise NPLs by 
roughly 0.3%. None of the studies however investigate the interlinkage between bank lending and their 
funding structure and this remains central to the empirical inquiry of the paper. 
 
III. Credit growth and funding mix: Stylized facts 
The oil boom since the early 2000 led to rapid improvements in economic growth in the GCC 
countries, so much so that the banking sector experienced rapid credit growth. In real terms, credit growth 
averaged well over 20% during 2003-08, leading to a sharp rise in the credit-to-GDP ratio in most of 
these countries. By way of example, the credit-to-GDP ratio, which ranged from 25-50% in 2001 in the 
GCC countries increased sharply thereafter to range between 32-65% during 2002-08 (World Bank, 
2010). Together with benign interest rates and buoyant economic activity, this supported higher demand 
for real estate and equities, pushing up prices across the region.  
 - 5 -  
 
Following Raddatz (2010), we define retail dependence (Retail) as the ratio of retail deposits to 
total liabilities, where retail deposits is total deposits netted for bank deposits. As earlier, we transform 
this variable, according as: 
)Re1(log tailWholesale +-=                                                                                                    (1) 
so that higher values of Wholesale represents greater reliance on wholesale deposits.  
 
IV. Database and empirical strategy 
The present data covers the period 1996-2009. We started off with a total of over 100 banks, but 
subsequently deleted the finance and investment companies, including investment banks, leaving us with 
80 banks. Several banks also do not report data on some relevant variables required for the analysis, such 
as the dependent variable (or some of its components). These banks were therefore excluded from the 
analysis. Finally, to moderate the influence of outliers, we winsorized the top and bottom 1% of 
observations for the dependent variable. This left us with data on 67 banks at an average of 9.1 years of 
observation per year, with a total of 645 bank-years. Table 1 provides the details.  
 Table 2 enlists the reliance on retail funding by GCC banks during the sample period, by 
ownership (Panel A), by country (Panel B) and by crisis (Panel C). Later in the analysis, we employ 
dummy variables to control for these characteristics. Without loss of generality, it appears that Islamic 
banks display greater reliance on retail deposits as compared to commercial banks.  
 Turning to country-level variations, the evidence strongly suggests wide divergence across 
countries in terms of their retail dependence. Banks in Bahrain and Kuwait are observed to exhibit lowest 
retail dependence. Consider, for example, banks in Bahrain. On average, roughly 50% of their deposits 
are retail as compared to nearly 85% in case of Qatari banks. This difference is statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level. In most of the other instances, and especially for Bahrini and Kuwaiti banks, their 
differences vis-a-vis banks in other countries are statistically significant as well. 
 Banks also appear to have increased their wholesale dependence, especially during the crisis. To 
see this, note that prior to the crisis, nearly 77% of overall banks deposits were retail in nature. This 
declined to around 66% during the crisis. The difference is observed to be statistically significant.  
Looking at real loan growth, the evidence indicates that commercial banks expanded their loan 
book at a much faster rate as compared to Islamic banks. These differences are observed to be statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level. In terms of country-level differences in loan expansion, the evidence 
indicates that loan growth was much more subdued in Oman and Saudi Arabia as compared to their other 
GCC neighbours. Loan growth in Oman was significantly lower than in most other countries. As well, AE 
banks loan book grew strongly as compared to Saudi Arabia. These differences were strongly significant 
at conventional levels.  
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The univariate results in Table 2 are strongly supportive of significant differences across banks in 
terms of their retail dependence. The subsequent correlation analysis is also suggestive of differences in 
loan growth across banks, depending on their extent of wholesale dependence or bank ownership. These 
tests do not take into consideration several bank-specific variables. By way of example, lending could 
differ by bank size. The soundness and fragility of banks could also be an important consideration. 
Similarly, the state of the banking industry as also the macroeconomic environment could impinge on 
bank lending. Taking these concerns on board, we employ a multivariate regression framework, by 
specifying a reduced-form equation for bank b in country c of the following form:  
cbccbcc
cccbcbcb
eCRISISCOUNTRYISLAMICMACROSYS
CRISISISLAMICGROWTHWholesaleBANKLoans
,092008109,876
0920085432,,10, )(
++++++
+++++=D
-
-
jjjjj
jjjjjj
      (2)               
where ΔLoans is the real growth rate of loans (measured as the difference between log-loans at time t and 
log-loans at time t-1), BANK is a matrix of bank level variables included with a lag to avoid endogeneity 
problems, SYS is the banking industry level variables, including measures of financial development 
(proxied by bank credit to GDP) and concentration (asset share of three largest banks), MACRO is the set 
of macroeconomic variables such as inflation (proxied by change in GDP deflator) and real non-oil GDP 
growth (GROWTH), the measure of job-creating economic activity in these countries (IMF, 2010). 
ISLAMIC is the ownership dummy for Islamic banks, COUNTRY are the fixed effects that controls for 
country-specific factors (geography, institutions, etc.) and CRISIS2008-09 is a dummy to take into account 
the recent economic crisis. Finally, eb,c is the error term.  
 The coefficients of interest are Wholesale – the dependence on wholesale funds by bank b in 
country c - and its interaction terms. A positive (negative) estimate of φ2 would indicate that banks with 
greater dependence on wholesale funds tend to lower lending. The interaction term of wholesale 
dependence with GDP growth enables to discern pro-cyclicality in bank lending: to the extent that banks 
with greater wholesale dependence lower lending in an economic upturn, the coefficient on φ3 would be 
negative. As a result, if the φ3 coefficient is positive and large enough to outweigh a negative value of φ2, 
this would suggest that banks with greater wholesale dependence tend to over-extend credit in the upturn 
of the business cycle, since the value of (φ2+ φ3) increases (for a positive estimate of φ3), indicating 
greater sensitivity of lending to economic growth for such banks. Similar interpretations can be advanced 
for the other interaction terms.   
Funding strategy of banks is however, likely to be endogenous. A case in point was the recent 
subprime crisis, where banks funding pattern was an important consideration behind their lending 
strategy. Employing data on syndicated loans, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that new loan to 
large borrowers fell during the recent financial crisis and that this decrease was larger among banks with 
less deposit financing.  Cornett et al. (2010) also provide evidence to suggest that banks with more stable 
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sources of funding were better able to continue lending. As a result, we follow a two-stage regression 
procedure. In stage 1, banks’ wholesale dependence is regressed on a set of exogenous variables. This 
provides us the value of predicted wholesale dependence. To complete the procedure, eq. (2) is estimated 
after replacing wholesale dependence by its predicted value.  
The literature identifies several determinants of banks’ funding strategy (BIS, 2010). These 
include, inter alia, scale economies (a minimum size allows banks to better diversify their funding 
sources), market power (greater market power might facilitate banks’ access to retail deposits) and 
overhead costs (higher overhead costs might impel banks to compensate for the same by increasing 
reliance on wholesale funds). At the macroeconomic level, we include per capita GDP (GDP/population), 
inflation and the real non-oil GDP growth (GROWTH).  
The empirical estimation proceeds in several stages. First, we estimate (2) as above, using real 
loan growth as the dependent variable and addressing the endogenity issue. However, as observed earlier, 
some countries have more observations than others. Therefore, the results could be driven by countries 
with a disproportionately larger number of observations. Following recent research (Micco et al., 2007), 
we address this issue by weighing each observation by 1/Nb,t (i.e., the bank’s share in total assets in 
country b in year t).  
In all regressions, we use a standard set of control variables, the importance of which has been 
emphasized in recent research (Berger et al., 2005; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008, Nier and Zicchino, 2006). 
We use both total size (proxied by log of total asset, LTA) and relative size (proxied by asset of a given 
bank in a country c in a given year to total bank asset in the country in that year, SHTA). The first 
variable controls for scale economies and the second controls for market power. Besides, we include 
measures of capitalization (proxied by equity-to-total asset ratio, EQTY), liquidity (proxied by the liquid 
asset-to-total asset ratio, LQDTY) and non-interest income (proxied by fee income-to-total asset ratio, 
FEE). The rationale for employing the latter set of variables is that capitalization and liquidity tends to 
differ between Islamic and commercial banks owing to their different business profile and non interest 
income tends to be higher for banks that derive a major part of their income from commissions. 
Throughout the analysis, the reported standard errors take on board the possibility of serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity pertaining to the same bank (i.e., bank-level clustered standard errors). 
 
V. Discussion of the results  
V.1 Determinants of wholesale dependence 
We first detail the first-step regressions, which study the determinants of banks’ wholesale 
dependence. The results, reported in Table 3 show that we are not able to reject the Sargan test. Moreover, 
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we are not able to reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation. In other words, this 
suggests that the GMM model is well specified. 
Regarding the explanatory variables, there is evidence of high level of persistence in the 
dependent variable. Most control variables exhibit expected signs. Smaller banks with higher overheads 
tend to display greater wholesale dependence. The point estimates suggest that an increase in banks size 
by 10% lowers wholesale dependence by nearly 1%. Among the macroeconomic variables, relatively 
well-off countries with lower inflation tend to rely more on wholesale funds.  
 
V.2 Determinants of bank loan growth 
The first stage of the regressions provides us with the predicted values of wholesale dependence. 
We use these predicted values for the second-stage regressions, as outlined in eq. (2). The regression 
results are set out in Table 4.  
First, we briefly discuss the control variables. Well-capitalized banks appear to extend more 
credit. This is consistent with the literature which suggests that bank soundness is an important factor 
influencing their credit decisions (Nier and Zicchino, 2005). At the banking industry level, higher levels 
of concentration, by lowering competition, acts as a brake on credit. On the other hand, higher levels of 
financial development appear to create a conducive environment of credit expansion. The evidence 
conclusively points to the fact that recent financial crisis has exerted a negative impact on banks’ credit 
growth. At the macroeconomic level, higher GDP growth, by raising economic activity, improves credit 
growth. Private credit increases with inflation, but less than one-to-one, implying that inflation, in fact, 
dampens real private credit growth (Guo and Stepanyan, 2011).  
After controlling for other factors including country effects, the results strongly support the fact 
that banks with higher wholesale dependence tend to decrease lending. The relation is economically 
meaningful, as well. For example, a 1% increase in wholesale dependence reduces real loan growth 
roughly 3%. A coefficient above unity on wholesale dependence indicates that bank credit grows more 
than proportionally with reduced reliance on wholesale funds, which is not surprising, given the nature of 
bank-based nature of financial systems that typifies these economies.  
Col. (2) includes the interaction terms. The effect of the business cycle variable is extremely 
large. Consider, for instance, the impact of the economic activity variable on bank credit in the country 
where real non-oil GDP grew by 6 percent, the median growth rate in the sample. Ignoring the impact of 
the business cycle, the effect is approximately 2.3 percentage points. However, if the impact of the 
business cycle is taken into account, the point estimates of Col. (2) yield an estimate of approximately 2.7 
percentage points (= -2.3-0.06*6.4).  
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Col. (3) considers the response to bank lending by Islamic banks. The point estimates in Col. (3) 
indicate that Islamic banks with greater wholesale dependence cut their bank lending by a relatively lower 
magnitude as compared to commercial banks. Whereas overall, banks lowered their lending by roughly 
3.1% in response to a 1% rise in wholesale dependence, for Islamic banks, these magnitudes were lower 
by about 20%. Using cross-country data on roughly 120 banks in several countries with significant 
commercial and Islamic bank presence, Maher and Dridi (2010) conclude that credit growth by the latter 
group were relatively less affected by the crisis, a finding consistent with the current analysis. 
Col. (4) considers the impact of the crisis on loan growth. Here again, the analysis is a pointer to 
the fact that the crisis exacerbated the dampening impact on credit growth, lowering it by 23%.  
 The final column considers the impact of all the relevant variables, taken together. The estimates 
on wholesale and its interaction terms suggest that the impact of growth on bank lending is quite large. To 
obtain a better sense of the magnitudes, we examine the differential in bank lending of an average Islamic 
bank located in a country impacted by a crisis. The point estimates in Col. (5) suggest that, in such as 
case, bank lending would have been lower by roughly 2.4%. Taking on board the growth impact, the 
magnitudes are extremely large. Consider, for instance, a country with a growth of 4.1%, the lowest 
average growth in the sample. For such a country, the overall magnitude of the impact would be of the 
order of -2.7%. On the other hand, for the country with a growth of 9.8% - the highest average growth in 
the sample - the point estimates yield a magnitude of nearly 3.2% - a difference of nearly 20% as 
compared to the previous estimate.  
Summing up, the results indicate that banks with greater wholesale dependence did cut back their 
lending; the impact was exacerbated by business cycle considerations.   
 
VI. Concluding remarks 
The issue of procyclicality in bank lending has come into sharp focus following the recent 
financial crisis. Standard-setting bodies and regulators have been making efforts at developing 
macroprudential instruments to mitigate such procyclicality (BIS, 2009; IMF, 2009; Caruana, 2010). One 
area of concern has been the role played by banks’ funding pattern in influencing such procyclical 
behaviour.  
Using disaggregated data on GCC banks for 1996-2009, the paper employs panel data techniques 
to explore the lending behavior of GCC banks that incorporates the period of the recent economic crisis. 
The analysis indicates significant differences in banks’ lending as well as funding patterns, judged in 
terms of ownership, countries and even the pre- and post-crisis periods. More specifically, banks with 
greater dependence on wholesale funds appear to have cut back lending by a significant amount. The 
procyclicality of the financial system and the crisis exacerbated the effect, although the impact was a bit 
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moderate for Islamic banks. These results are quite robust. It is apparent in simple univariate comparisons 
as well as in multivariate regressions that controls for various bank-level, banking industry level and 
macroeconomic variables. Robustness checks of the results based on alternate estimation techniques 
appear to lend credence to these findings. These findings are in congruence with recent research (Hasan 
and Dridi, 2010).  
The findings have important ramifications, some of which are already being taken on board in 
recent policymaking. For one, it appears that traditional banks – with a reliance on deposit funding - are 
relatively safe as compared to those with have a high proportion of non-deposit funds in their liability 
mix. Illustratively, countries (UK, Spain, Iceland, Ireland) and banks (Northern Rock and Bradford and 
Bingley in the UK, Fortisbank of Belgium2, UBS and Credit Suisse of Switzerland) with overt reliance on 
wholesale funding seem to have been hit hardest by the recent crisis. Therefore, in conjunction with other 
monetary and prudential ratios, the banks’ funding composition can also provide important signals to 
policy makers regarding their health and viability. Second, uncontrolled expansion of the loan book in the 
quest for garnering market share could be a recipe for future problems. Across countries, over-stretched 
financial systems and “search for yields” has been found to lead to riskier banking systems, leading 
commentators to seek for imposition of “speed limits”, either on their loan book or on segments that 
appear in danger of over-extension. Macroprudential measures to moderate growth in certain segments of 
the financial sector have been undertaken in several countries such as India (commercial real estate 
lending), Korea (credit card business), Indonesia (housing loans), Estonia (residential property), Portugal 
(housing loans) and Romania (consumer and mortgage loans).  
Prior to the crisis, there was a growing trend worldwide towards universal banking, so that banks 
were relying on a combination of deposit and non-deposit funding to support their asset book. The crisis 
demonstrated that, while such a strategy could entail substantial benefits to the bank in terms of scale and 
scope economies, there are limits as to how far banks can veer away from traditional banking models, 
especially if they are to conduct their business in a safe and cost-efficient manner.  
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Table 1. Number of observations per country 
Country N.banks N.Obs (Avg.) Total Obs. 
Bahrain (BH) 15 9.1 236 
Kuwait (KW) 5 5.3 135 
Oman (OM) 7 8.9 29 
Qatar (QA) 8 10.6 62 
Saudi Arabia (SA) 10 9.9 84 
United Arab Emirates (AE) 22 10.7 99 
Total 67 9.1 645 
 
 
Table 2. Retail dependence and loan growth across various characteristics  
Variables Retail  N.Obs Loan growth N.Obs 
Panel A: Ownership     
Commercial 0.725 (0.328) 496 0.072 (0.156) 484 
Islamic 0.752 (0.295) 218 0.061 (0.088) 215 
t-test for difference 1.084  1.151  
Panel B: Country     
Bahrain 0.515 (0.471) 161 0.073 (0.216) 153 
Kuwait 0.668 (0.182) 34 0.075 (0.121) 50 
Oman 0.814 (0.099) 65 0.048 (0.059) 64 
Qatar 0.835 (0.254) 92 0.070 (0.083) 88 
Saudi Arabia 0.806 (0.089) 106 0.053 (0.070) 100 
United Arab Emirates (AE) 0.826 (0.249) 256 0.080 (0.105) 242 
t-test for difference     
Bahrain v. Kuwait 3.149***  0.107  
Bahrain v. Oman 7.627***  1.278  
Bahrain v. Qatar 7.016***  0.114  
Bahrain v. Saudi Arabia 7.621***  1.034  
Bahrain v. AE 7.724***  0.417  
Kuwait v. Oman 4.337***  1.443  
Kuwait v. Qatar 4.085***  0.252  
Kuwait v. Saudi Arabia 4.252***  1.196  
Kuwait v. AE 4.535***  0.283  
Oman v. Qatar 0.739  1.911**  
Oman v. Saudi Arabia 0.519  0.465  
Oman v. AE 0.630  3.195***  
Qatar v. Saudi Arabia 1.057  1.527  
Qatar v. AE 0.295  0.903  
Saudi Arabia v. AE 1.143  2.792***  
Panel C: Crisis     
Pre-crisis (1996-2007) 0.767 (0.318) 559 0.073 (0.109) 552 
Crisis (2008-09) 0.657 (0.305) 155 0.053 (0.107) 147 
t-test for difference 3.957***  1.092  
Standard deviation within parentheses  
***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively 
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Table 3. Regression results for determinants of wholesale dependence 
Variable  Coefficient 
Lag (Wholesale)  0.122 (0.054)** 
LTA -0.081 (0.023)*** 
SHTA -0.015 (0.149) 
Overhead cost 0.653 (0.299)** 
GDP/population 0.152 (0.043)*** 
GROWTH 0.044 (0.043) 
INFLATION -0.048 (0.018)*** 
Period 1996-2009 
Banks; N.Observations 67; 548 
Sargan test (p-Value) 0.259 
AR (1); AR(2) 0.000; 0.126 
Standard errors within parentheses 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively 
AR (1) and AR (2) are the first-and second-order autocorrelation and follows N(0, 1) 
 
 
Table 4. Regression results for loan growth 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Wholesale -2.776  
(0.643)*** 
-2.331  
(0.807)*** 
-3.051  
(0.618)*** 
-2.902  
(0.408)*** 
-2.713  
(0.498)*** 
Wholesale*GROWTH  -6.404  
(1.254)*** 
  -8.151 
(2.045)*** 
Wholesale* ISLAMIC   0.629  
(0.220)*** 
 0.906  
(1.124) 
Wholesale*CRISIS    -0.669 
(0.374)* 
-0.569  
(0.328)* 
LTA -0.002  
 (0.009) 
-0.002  
(0.009) 
-0.003  
(0.008) 
-0.002  
(0.008) 
-0.002  
(0.008) 
SHTA -0.129  
(0.204) 
-0.125  
(0.206) 
-0.153 
(0.215) 
-0.155  
(0.178) 
-0.183  
(0.179) 
EQTY 0.106  
(0.056)* 
0.105  
(0.056)* 
0.106  
(0.056)* 
0.105  
(0.054)* 
0.103  
(0.054)* 
LQDTY 0.095  
(0.071) 
0.097  
(0.071) 
0.096  
(0.070) 
0.096  
(0.069) 
0.099  
(0.069) 
FEE 0.351  
(0.967) 
0.405  
(0.968) 
0.291  
(0.921) 
0.342  
(0.995) 
0.328  
(0.969) 
Concentration -0.412  
(0.092)*** 
-0.407  
(0.091)*** 
-0.411  
(0.093)*** 
-0.415  
(0.100)*** 
-0.407 
(0.101)*** 
Financial development 0.109  
(0.057)* 
0.114  
(0.059)* 
0.109  
(0.057)* 
0.108  
(0.055)** 
0.114  
(0.057)** 
GROWTH 0.332  
(0.064)*** 
0.353  
(0.064)*** 
0.332  
(0.064)*** 
0.336  
(0.063)*** 
0.361  
(0.061)*** 
INFLATION 0.132  
(0.066)** 
0.126  
(0.068)* 
0.133  
(0.066)** 
0.126 
 (0.085)*** 
0.120  
(0.086) 
ISLAMIC -0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.006  
(0.008) 
-0.006  
(0.008) 
-0.006  
(0.007) 
-0.006  
(0.007) 
CRISIS -0.046  
(0.020)** 
-0.047  
(0.021)** 
-0.046  
(0.020)** 
-0.047  
(0.025)** 
-0.049  
(0.025)** 
Intercept 0.152  
(0.082)* 
0.146  
(0.081)* 
0.154  
(0.081)* 
0.149  
(0.080)* 
0.146  
(0.079)* 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Diagnostics      
Time period 1996-2009 1996-2009 1996-2009 1996-2009 1996-2009 
Banks;  N.Obs 67; 486 67; 486 67; 486 67; 486 67; 486 
R-squared 0.1467 0.1480 0.1476 0.1473 0.1500 
Standard errors (clustered by bank) are within parentheses 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively 
